Wednesday, December 9, 2009
Unusual solution
Monday, December 7, 2009
It Works and Needs Replication
Copied from CrimProf BLog (http://tinyurl.com/yhg9njd)
"A Cincinnati experiment has changed the way police deal with gang violence"
The Crime Report has this interesting story here. In part:
The Cincinnati study provides a detailed account of how the city’s police force implemented the anti-violence strategy, which is based essentially on identifying gang members and then calling them in for a meeting, or a series of meetings, attended by both law enforcement and community representatives. There, they are told that they have two choices: they can continue their lawbreaking activities and face severe punishment; or they can agree to accept counseling or other services aimed at dealing with the problems that contributed to their gang participation.
The deep involvement of community leaders , parents and pastors, whose moral authority carries a powerful impact, combined with the threat of punishment acts as a form of focused deterrence, say adherents of the model. Similar strategies directed at gang members or drug dealers in cities like High Point, NC, Providence, RI and Hempstead, NY have resulted in a marked falloff in gang violence and the disappearance of open-air narcotics markets.
Is the law too broadly interpreted
Justices to Weigh Honest-Services Law
An unusual coalition of groups has come together to
criticize the federal government’s increasing reliance
on a statute that is commonly used but little understood:
honest-services fraud.
The honest-services law, on the federal books since 1988,
broadly requires that public and corporate officials
act in the best interests of their constituents or employers.
It has become an important tool for federal prosecutors,
who used it successfully against the lobbyist Jack Abramoff
and many of his associates. It is an element of the cases
against former Gov. Rod Blagojevich of Illinois;
the former New York State Senate majority leader,
Joseph L. Bruno; and former Gov. Donald E. Siegelman of Alabama.
Prosecutors have described the law as a valuable instrument
against corruption at a time when officials have become
increasingly sophisticated at covering their tracks.
But critics say it is used too broadly, is applied inconsistently,
and too often criminalizes behavior that fails to merit the
full weight of federal prosecution. The Supreme Court
will hear three cases concerning the honest-services law
in this term, with two coming up for oral argument on Tuesday.
Opposition to use of the law has emerged from across the
political spectrum, from the United States Chamber of Commerce
and the Washington Legal Foundation on the right,
to the more left-leaning National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
“Could an insincere sermon at Sunday religious services come
within the statute?” asked the chamber, half sarcastically,
in a brief to the Supreme Court.
Justice Antonin Scalia has been harshly critical of the
honest-services law, writing in a recent dissent that it has
been applied to “a staggeringly broad swath of behavior.”
He said that it “invites abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors
in pursuit of local officials, state legislators, and corporate
C.E.O.s who engage in any manner of unappealing or
ethically questionable conduct.”
One of the two cases coming before the court next week
involves Conrad M. Black, the newspaper executive
who was convicted of defrauding his media company,
Hollinger International. He is arguing that the law
should not be applied to him because he did not
contemplate “economic harm” to Hollinger.
In the second, Bruce Weyhrauch, a former Alaska state
legislator, was convicted of failing to disclose a conflict
of interest. He had not violated state law, however,
and argues that the federal prosecution on honest-services
charges violates important principles of federalism.
The third case, to be argued later in the term, involves
Jeffrey K. Skilling, the former chief executive of Enron.
He is arguing that the honest-services law is unconstitutionally vague.
Melanie Sloan, the executive director of Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington, a nonprofit watchdog group,
scoffed at the idea that the law is so vague that people
do not know when they have crossed the line, especially
in the three cases before the Supreme Court.
“If you go to those cases — Black, Skilling and Weyhrauch —
and look at what they did, a kindergartner knows
that they were wrong,” she said. “It’s not credible
that those guys really had no idea that what they
were doing would get them into trouble. What they
thought was that they wouldn’t get caught.”
The watchdog group’s brief to the Supreme Court called
the law “an indispensable weapon in the prosecutorial
arsenal for fighting government corruption” since it offers
“a much easier evidentiary burden” than bribery law.
Critics of the law, however, say that its vagueness is used
to bolster corruption cases in which the evidence
might be weak or the offense, while perhaps distasteful, is minor.
That is the argument of Larry Remer, a political consultant in
San Diego who faced multiple felony charges after
successfully running a bond campaign for a community college.
After the campaign was over, and the campaign fund depleted,
a video production company sent in a bill for $5,800.
The college president proposed paying the bill with
public money, ostensibly by buying outtakes from
the video company, though it is illegal to use public money
for such a campaign.
Federal prosecutors indicted Mr. Remer and the college president
in 2004 on a range of charges related to the improper
use of taxpayer money, including honest-services charges.
Mr. Remer said he was baffled by the case.
“I do understand the need to get the sleazebags,” said Mr. Remer,
whose case ended in a mistrial and a plea of guilty, along with
the college president, to misdemeanor charges of improperly
using public money, not honest-services charges. “But let’s
get them with real laws. Let’s not just say we need to get
this guy, so we’ll use this law because it can be
melted to meet our needs.”
The United States attorneys office in San Diego
declined to comment on the case.
The honest-services statute grew out of the Supreme
Court’s earlier attempts to rein in the widening use by
prosecutors of mail and wire fraud laws, said John C. Coffee,
a professor at Columbia Law School.
In a landmark 1987 decision, the Supreme Court
limited mail and wire fraud prosecutions to cases
involving tangible goods like money and property,
and not the “intangible right” of the people to good government.
Within a year, however, Congress restored the prosecutors’
flexible tool by passing the current law.
Since then, critics argue, chaos has resulted, with significant
differences across the country in the ways that the statute is interpreted.
Bennett L. Gershman, a professor at Pace University Law School,
said the power of prosecutors to overreach by focusing on a person
to prosecute and then finding a law to apply “is not only subject
to abuse under the honest-services theory, but has been abused”
in cases like those involving Mr. Siegelman, the former Alabama governor.
The charges against Mr. Siegelman, including honest-services fraud,
concerned a contribution from a businessman, Richard M. Scrushy,
to an issue campaign advocated by the governor, who
later reappointed Mr. Scrushy to a state hospital board.
The Department of Justice has conducted an investigation
of the case and found no misconduct in the prosecution;
Mr. Siegelman’s supporters say the investigation was
poorly conducted. Mr. Siegelman has appealed to the
Supreme Court, which has not decided whether to take
up the case.
Ms. Sloan, of the watchdog group, said that if prosecutors
abused the statute, “it doesn’t mean the whole statute is at fault.”
“It means the prosecutors made some bad decisions,” she said.
Richard L. Thornburgh, who was attorney general when the
honest-services law was passed, said he expected the
Supreme Court to issue “something fairly sweeping”
since it had taken on so many honest-services cases.
But, he added, “I think they can do it without doing
violence to proper law enforcement.”
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Warped Sense of Humor
4 American Teenagers Arrested in Japan
TOKYO — Four teenagers from an American military
base in Japan were arrested on charges of attempted
murder on Saturday for allegedly toppling a woman
riding her motorbike, causing her to suffer a serious
head injury.
In the August episode, which has received national
coverage in Japan, a 23-year-old motorbike rider
suffered a fractured skull when she hit rope that
the authorities say had been strung across a road
by the four teenagers near the Yokota Air Base in Tokyo.
The suspects are three boys and a girl, ages 15 to 18,
who all are children of United States military personnel.
Local police officers arrested them after surveillance
videotapes showed them near the site of the crash.
One of the teenagers sought help from a passer-by
for the injured woman, according to news reports.
The police said that American officials were cooperating
in the investigation.
Base-related crime is a delicate issue in Japan, where
about 47,000 American troops are stationed under a
mutual security pact. The United States and Japan are
still negotiating the relocation of another United States
military base, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
in Okinawa, in the aftermath of a public outcry over
the rape of a local schoolgirl by three American
servicemen in 1995.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Is 29 years on Death Row Cruel and Unusual Punishment
in Tennessee. The issue of the 8th Amendment's violation
came up in an opinion by Justice Stevens that was joined
by Justice Breyer. Both Justices believe that the issue
of being held for many years prior to execution is one the
Supreme Court should consider. Justice Thomas opposes
doing this.
To read a fuller discussion and have links to the opinion
itself click here.
Study says Capital Punishment Does NOT Deter
the bottom of the article to the issue that has the report
From Crime and Justice Newsletter
Capital Punishment Not Likely A Murder Deterrent: Study
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Contrary to the common belief that capital punishment deters
murderers, a study by Tomislav Kovandzic, Lynne Vieraitis,
and Denise Paquette Boots of the University of Texas at Dallas
concludes that most offenders do not likely weigh the costs
and benefits of crime and are not likely to be deterred by
the existence of the death penalty. Many homicides are
committed when offenders are under extreme emotional
duress and are unlikely to be thinking of the legal sanctions.
The study, in the November 2009 issue of the journal Criminology
and Public Policy, edited at Florida State University, says
that for the death penalty to serve as a deterrent, the
probability of getting caught and punished must be
greater than any benefit the offender could achieve
from committing the crime. Commenting on the study,
Paul Rubin of Emory University contends that the mere
probability of execution is likely to deter at least some
potential murderers. Rubin finds studies of capital punishment
problematic because only convicted criminals are
examined-not those who have been deterred-and
because the death penalty is imposed too infrequently
and erratically to measure its deterrent effects well.
The journal is sent to members of the American Society of Criminology.
Criminology & Public Policy journal
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
First Amendment and Lawyers
difficult to follow if it conflicts with their
fiduciary duty to the client. This case is before
the Supreme Court, and while it involves bankruptcy,
it clearly shows how laws can have unintended
consequences.
December 2, 2009
Federal Law Limiting Legal Advice Draws Particular Interest at the Supreme Court
By ADAM LIPTAK
WASHINGTON — Several justices seemed convinced on Tuesday that a federal law restricting the advice bankruptcy lawyers may offer was a bad idea. But they had differing ideas about what the Supreme Court should do about it.
“It’s a stupid law,” Justice Antonin Scalia said. “Where is the prohibition of stupid laws in the Constitution?”
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., on the other hand, appeared receptive to the argument that the law violated the First Amendment by intruding into the relationship between lawyers and clients.
The justices, all of whom are lawyers, seemed to take particular interest in the case, presumably because it concerns lawyers’ free speech rights.
“Congress often forgets about the First Amendment,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said, “but lawyers don’t.”
The law forbids advising clients “to incur more debt in contemplation of” a bankruptcy filing. Piling on debt just before filing for bankruptcy in the hope that it will not have to be repaid is, all concerned agreed, an abuse of the system and may amount to fraud. But state ethics rules already forbid lawyers to advise their clients to break the law.
On the other hand, some new debt is both legal and prudent. It may be a good idea to refinance a mortgage to pay down credit card debt or to take out a loan to buy a car to get to work. The 2005 law seems to forbid lawyers to give advice about that second sort of action.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked about medical expenses. Suppose, she said, that a woman was “just told by her doctor that she has a serious cancer that needs operation and radiation and she is at the end of the line on resources.” Could the woman’s lawyer advise her to take on more debt to treat the cancer?
It depends, said William M. Jay, a lawyer for the government. Lawyers may not advise clients to add debt in two situations, he said: in an effort to abuse the bankruptcy system or to defraud creditors.
That answer did not satisfy Chief Justice Roberts. “Under your construction,” he told Mr. Jay, “it seems to me that a lawyer trying to give correct, legal, ethical advice has got to pause before every sentence” and worry about whether the advice will later be seen as a violation of the law.
The case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, No. 08-1119, was brought by a Minnesota law firm that objected to three parts of the law. In addition to the core First Amendment challenge, the firm argued that Congress had not meant to cover lawyers in the first place. That argument did not seem to gain much traction with the justices.
The firm also objected to a requirement in the law that its advertising include this statement or something like it: “We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. said he was troubled by that requirement. “A prospective client looks at that,” he said, “and they say, ‘Well, I don’t want a debt relief agency, I want a lawyer.’ “
Mr. Jay said the firm was free to add to and clarify the statement. “There is no restriction on what content goes in the ad,” he said, “only that it include this disclaimer.”
As for the part of the law restricting legal advice, Mr. Jay said it should be narrowed rather than struck down.
The law, the government said in a brief, should be read to bar “only advice to take on debt with an intent to abuse the bankruptcy laws, such as advice to charge a vacation, concert tickets or some similar purchase to a credit card, knowing that the purchaser will enjoy the full benefit of the purchase and then shed most or all of the debt in bankruptcy.”
But G. Eric Brunstad Jr., a lawyer for the Minnesota law firm, said the law “whipsaws the attorneys who are trying to apply it.” State ethics rules “say you have to give unfettered, candid advice to your client,” he said, while the federal law says “you must give truncated advice.”
Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company
